Saturday, January 10, 2009

Afghanistan--Strategy Anyone?

Recently the journalist who is taking over as anchor of Radio Canada's primary news program was interviewed by CBC. At one point, she was talking about Afghanistan and her belief in the positive changes that Canada's presence was having in Kandahar--girls in schools, more education, various positive local impacts supported by the professionalism and bravery of Canada's soldiers. Her belief in the Canadian presence in Afghanistan was apparent. As I listened, I was expecting a more strategic perspective to follow. None did.

Her perspective on Canada in Afghanistan reminded me of how General Hillier, the former commander of Canada's forces in the country, would sell the mission. It was a pitch focused almost wholly on local success stories. A soldier, even a journalist, can be forgiven for not having a strategic sensibility; they are not the ones responsible for coming up with the strategic justification for deploying Canada's forces. That justification has to come from the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. However, it was never offered by the Liberals, who first committed the troops, and it hasn't been offered by the conservatives who inherited the mission.

Harper, so far as I can tell, as done no better than this when he was unveiling a motion on the future of the mission:

My party has been proud and consistent in support of the Afghanistan mission since the Liberal Government first decided to send combat troops to that country in 2001. We believed, and continue to believe, that these actions are not only justified by the nature of the conflict, but also firmly rooted in the traditions of Canadian foreign and defence policy.

Then, after praising the troops, he adds We should be very proud of our contributions and accomplishments in Afghanistan.We are making a real, positive difference there.

Well, that explains everything! Now I get it. It's about the nature of the conflict, it's rooted in our traditions and--this is the kicker--we're making a difference. Canada has made a huge commitment to Afghanistan. So why hasn't a compelling rationale been offered? Perhaps because there isn't one. No compelling strategic reason for the engagement exists. (For Canada's entry into the commitment, read Unexpected War by Janice Stein and Eugene Lang) What's most worrisome is the apparent inability of the Canadian political class to think and speak strategically, particularly when compared to the U.S., even--dare I say it--when compared to George W. Bush.

First, an aside: to establish Bush as strategic, I need to offer a one-sentence aside on strategic thinking. At its simplest, strategic thinking is composed of two core elements: going up in altitude to see context, and projecting forward into the future to envision consequences and results. As an example, the sales pitch Bush finally landed on to sell his folly in Iraq--after weapons of mass destruction didn't work, and removing Saddam proved inadequate--was that Iraq would serve as the beachhead of democracy for the region. Eventually, so the theory went, democracy would come to the region, the U.S. dependence on foreign oil would no longer require it to buy from dictatorships, and with democracy in place, the Arab-Israeli dynamic would transform, etc., etc. Bush's rationale went up in altitude from Iraq to the larger context of the region, and then projected into the future, and up in altitude, to where the connection to the interests of the U.S. could be seen.

Never mind that it was pure fantasy, it's an example of connecting something far away to one's national interests. When an American then asks why are we in Iraq, an answer could come back that makes it clear it's not just about, or even primarily about, Iraq. Canadians, on the other hand, when asking why are we in Afghanistan, seem unable to receive any broader answer than our good soldiers are making a difference in Kandahar. True as that may be, it offers no explanation of why there as opposed to elsewhere, of why it might be in Canada's interest to pour significant resources into making a difference in a small local area of a country that no foreign force has been able to transform.

The U.S. wouldn't tolerate a signficant application of resources without a large and lofty reason. Vietnam had the domino theory--if Vietnam falls, then the region over time will fall into China's hand. Again, that's up in altitude and forward in time. Canada, on the other hand, seems content with good deed doing. Perhaps it's a remnant from its 40 year-long self-image as a nation of peacekeepers. We will deploy our forces there, between those two enemies and prevent them from killing each other. Clear purpose. No big context. Good deed doing...And so Afghanistan took Canada by surprise. Oh my god, we're in a war! What the ___! Not used to thinking strategically about force deployment, strategy never made it on the agenda. And it still hasn't.

The consolation for Canada: when there's no large strategic reason, Canadian politicians don't seem to have the guile to invent one; the U.S., on the other hand, would have no choice but to invent one and too often, it's wrong.

1 comment:

Bill Templeman said...

Hey Mongrel...this is good stuff. My take on this issue is that Canadian politicians cannot say the obvious: "We had to show the Bushocracy that we were serious about fighting terrorism, especially after we bailed on Iraq".

So we have stayed in Afghanistan to keep on the good side of Bush, and will continue to do so for Obama. This is part of why we are there.

Then there is the hunting Al Qaeda terrorist strategy, which got Canada involved in the first place, and kept us there until until the Keeping the US happy strategy kicked in shortly after the invasion of Iraq.

The "Keeping US Happy With Us" strategy has both altitude and future focus (sadly) for the political classes in Canada, but would cause citizens to start throwing hockey pucks at the parliament building.